

DISTURBANCE INVOLVING THE NORTHERN INTERCONNECTIONS NORTHEAST, SOUTH-EAST-NORTH-EAST AND NORTH-SOUTH-EAST

ÿ General description of the disturbance


ÿ Presentation of the ONS •

Sequence of the main events, until the separation of the North and Northeast regions from the rest of the SIN • Preliminary analysis of the dynamic performance of the SIN


- ÿ Presentation of Agents
 - Description of the disturbance and analysis of the performance of the protection systems, with the agents' view of the events involving their assets

ÿ Restoration Process


- ÿ Presentation of ONS
 - Actions to stabilize the system right after the shutdown
 - Analysis of the restoration of each electrical area Main difficulties faced in the restoration process
- ÿ Presentation of Agents
 - Description of the asset recomposition process, main difficulties and steps taken or in progress trend




MAIN EVENTS OF SEPARATION OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST AREAS FROM THE REST OF THE SIN




Origin of the Disturbance



Shutdown of LT 500 kV Quixadá – Fortaleza II






LT 500 kV Quixadá - Fortaleza


1st EVENT

North Frequency
Southeast Frequency
Northeast Frequency




Tempo (UTC) - Dia: 15/8/2023


UTC ÿ Universal time coordinates ÿ Brasilia time + 3hs













































North/Southeast Separation - PMU


































Separation of Subsystems - PMU




Satisfactory performance of the ERAC

- During the event, loss of generation was observed, based on the behavior of the frequency of the SIN. In this sense, in view of the generation deficit experienced by the SIN, the Regional Load Relief Scheme (ERAC) was implemented in order to promote the balance between load and generation.
- The ERAC performance analysis will be carried out in a specific meeting, to be held on 01/09.







SIN Dynamic Performance




SIN Dynamic Performance - Pre-Occurrence Operating Conditions (08:30 am)




SIN Dynamic Performance



SIN Dynamic Performance – Opening P. Dutra – Boa Esperança (PPS Performance)




SIN Dynamic Performance - Event Simulation with Official Database (Real-time case)



Simulation of the operating point immediately before the disturbance with official database (Steady case obtained from real time)

Dynamic Performance of the SIN - Simulation with the Official Database x Event (PMU)




Simulation with official database x PMU registration


Glossary to Identify the Simulations Performed


- Simulation with the official electromechanical transient database
 - The opening of LT 500 kV Quixadá Fortaleza II was reproduced using the official ONS dynamic database.
- Simulation with adjusted electromechanical transient database
 - The official electromechanical transient database, distributed by ONS, was adjusted in order to approximate the simulation response to field response, considering the opening of LT 500 kV Quixadá Fortaleza II. For
 - this, changes were made to some mathematical models of the generating parks in the region of interest, which are predominantly wind and photovoltaic.
 - The voltage observed in SE 500 kV Açu III is an indication that the adjusted models are more adherent to the field.
- Simulation for comparison with oscillography records
 - The adjusted database was used as a reference, in view of its adherence to the field response of the voltage in SE 500 kV Açu III.
 - In each comparison below, a simulation was performed in Anatem with the base adjusted, replacing only the model under analysis by the model of the official base, with the objective of evaluating its performance against the condi of the event, using oscillography data as a reference.


Official Base x PMU Register x Adjusted Electromechanical Transients Database





Official database x PMU registration x Adjusted database































© 2023 TomTom, © 2023 Microsoft Corporation, © OpenStreetMap Terms

SIN Voltages and Frequencies Visualized from the Phasor Measurement System



0

M© 2023 TomTom, © 2023 Microsoft Corporation, © OpenStreetMap Terms

50

Main Preliminary Findings

- The opening of the LT 500 kV Quixadá Fortaleza II was caused by the incorrect operation of the fault closing protection (Switch Onto Fault - SOTF) during normal line operation. It was also observed the improper performance of its scheme automatic reclosing.
- The opening of the LT 500 kV Quixadá Fortaleza II caused a significant reduction of tension in the system, resulting in the opening of LT 500 kV Presidente Dutra Boa Esperança for actuating the out-of-sync protection (PPS), which also commands the opening of the LT 500 kV Presidente Dutra Teresina II C1 and C2 and LT 500 kV Presidente Dutra Imperatriz C2 lines.
- The voltage reduction observed after the opening of the LT 500 kV Quixadá Fortaleza II was not verified in the simulations carried out by the ONS to reproduce the disturbance of 08/15/2023, using the real-time steady state case and the official electromechanical transient database, based on information provided by agents.
- In all studies carried out by ONS to define guidelines for the operation of the system, which include opening of LT 500kV Quixadá Fortaleza II, no voltage reduction was observed that violates the criteria established in Network Procedures and, therefore, any situation that resembles the occurrence of 08/15/2023.
- After the PPS action, there was a cascade shutdown of system equipment, leading to a blackout in the North region and the partial disconnection of loads from the Northeast region.
- After the separation of the North and Northeast by action of the protection systems, the performance of the Regional Scheme was of of Load Relief (ERAC) in order to recover the balance between load and generation, reducing load shedding in the South, Southeast and Midwest, energy importers at that time.

Main Preliminary Findings

- Given the scope and complexity of this nuisance, the ONS requested and received a significant amount
 of oscillographic records, which made it possible to identify signs that the generation sources close to the
 area of interest did not perform as expected with regard to voltage control.
- The most consistent line of investigation points to this performance below expectations as a second
 event that triggered the entire subsequent transmission line shutdown process, the ONS
 was able to satisfactorily reproduce the disturbance by changing the transient database
 electromechanical, highlighting a possible difference between the behavior of equipment controls
 effectively implemented in the field and the performance of the mathematical models made available to the ONS.
- It is based on exhaustive simulations that ONS identifies safe regions of operation and determines the generation of the various energy sources that make up the SIN to supply the load, ensuring compliance with the performance standards set out in the Grid Procedures, particularly the criterion that Simple contingencies in the electrical network must not cause loads to be cut.
- In order for the ONS to guarantee safe operation 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, it is imperative that dynamic models in the database faithfully represent the performance of implemented controls in the field of all plants with a direct relationship with the Operator.
- Given the scope and complexity of this disorder, the ONS continues to deepen the analyzes of the disturbance to a final conclusion.





Disturbance on 08/15/2023 at 8:30 am involving the N/SE, N/NE and SE/NE interconnections

Analysis of the restoration process

RAP meeting - 08/25/2023

Agenda

- 1. Post-disorder initial situation
- 2. Main actions for system stabilization
- 3. Recomposition analysis: overview and by area
- 4. Main difficulties of the recomposition process

Pre-disturbance situation: 08:30

<u> </u>					
North					
Generation	Verified Schedu	led 2,493 2,514			
Hydraulics					
Thermal	1.399	1.389			
Wind	210	304			
Solar	3	0			
Total	4.104	4.207			

Charge	Verified Schedu	led 6,588 6,561
Total		

illea	ası	L					
ner	rat	tioi	n				
2	2.5	539)				
	;	38	7				449
16	6.3	317	,			16.	745
3	3.2	211	i			3.	681
22	2.4	154				23.3	334
er	1	2.5 16.3	2.539 38 16.317 3.211	2.539 387 16.317 3.211 22.454	2.539 387 16.317 3.211	2.539 387 16.317 3.211	2.539 387 16.317 16.7 3.211 3.6


Charge	Check Schedule	ed
Total	10.151 1	0.242

Data in MW

Solar generation and load without MMGD

	SIN	
Generation	Check Schedule	d
Hydraulics	35.284 3	5.267
Thermal	9.698	9.829
Wind	16.748	17.256
Solar	5.777	6.124
Total	67.508	68.476

Charge	Check Schedule	ed
Total	67.507 6	8.200



		Itaip	u 50Hz	Sou	theast/Midwest
				Generation	Check Sched
	On the		0	Hydraulics	20.180
Generation	Verified Schedu	led 10,073		Thermal	6.44
Hydraulics	10,206			Wind	
Thermal	1.468	1.486	-	Solar	2.56
Wind	218	204		Total	29.18
Solar	2	2			•
Total	11.761	11.898		Charge	Check Sched

\rightarrow	AC flow
	DC flux

Charge	Check Schedule	ed
Total	11.887 1	2.232

Southeast/Midwest					
Generation	Check Schedule	ed			
Hydraulics	20.180	20.088			
Thermal	6.445	6.505			
Wind	3	3			
Solar	2.562	2.441			
Total	29.189	29.037			

Charge	Check Schedule	ed
Total	38.882	39.165

Post-occurrence situation: 08:40

North			
Generation	Verified Schedu	led 0 2,514	
Hydraulics			
Thermal	0	1.389	
Wind	0	304	
Solar	0	0	
Total	0	4.207	

Charge	Verified Scheduled 30 6,561	
Total		

5	Who have	-
1	do	y Jan
	FNXG	= 0 MW Limit = 6.000 MW
		0

Itaipu 50Hz

Porto Velho

Northeast	
led Generation	
750	
117	449
2.983	16.745
515	3.681
4.365	23.334
	117 2.983 515


Data in MW

Solar generation and load without MMGD

Charge	Check Schedule	d
Total	4.335 1	0.242

SIN		
Generation	Check Schedule	ed
Hydraulics	33.601 3	5.267
Thermal	6.910	9.829
Wind	3.172	17.256
Solar	1.949	6.124
Total	45.632	68.476

Charge	Check Schedule	ed
Total	45.482 6	3.200



FNS = 110 MW | Limit = 4,000 MW

FNESE = 30 MW | Limit = 7.000 MW

FNS+FNESE = 141 MW | Limit = 8,600 MW

On the		
Generation	Verified Schedu	led 11,608
Hydraulics	10,206	
Thermal	1.115	1.486
Wind	186	204
Solar	3	2
Total	12.912	11.898


AC flow
 DC flux

Charge	Check Schedule	ed
Total	9.965 1	2.232

Southeast/Midwest			
Generation Check Scheduled			
Hydraulics	21.243	20.088	
Thermal	5.677	6.505	
Wind	3	3	
Solar	1.431	2.441	
Total	28.355	29.037	

c	Charge	Check Schedule	ed
Т	otal	31.153	39.165

Load shedding by state



31% do SIN


99.5% of the North

61% from the Northeast


20% from the


South 20% from the Southeast/Midwest

SIN Overview - Pre-disorder situation: 08:30 am




SIN Overview - Post-disturbance situation





Post-occurrence control actions


- 1) In the Northeast:
 - Actions for voltage control.
 - Limitation of wind and solar generation on the amount that remained synchronized after the occurrence.
- 2) Well S/SE/CO
 - Maximization of hydraulic generation in synchronized plants to restore load/generation balance.
 - Actions for voltage control.







recomposition

Evolution of recomposition






Evolution of recomposition



Equipment turned off

Subsystem	Transmission lines 156 202 0	transformers
N	12	199
NO	370	196
S		0
SE/CO		4
Total		399






Recomposition of the Northeast Subsystem

Machine Translated by Google Configuration at 08:40 am - Start of recomposition Service Conditions - 08:40 am 750 hydroelectric **UHE Luiz Gonzaga** Wind 2.983 1 AND photovoltaic 515 188 MW Thermal 116 30 FNESE - (NE -> SE) P. Afonso IV FNEN – (NE -> N) 2 AND 4.334 543 MW At 08:53, the ONS authorized the restoration of the interrupted load. At 8:43 am, the 1st GU at UHE Itapebi was synchronized and the load taking started in the Itapebi Corridor. At 9:22 am, the reestablishment of loads was authorized

section energized

Machine Translated by Google Configuration at 09:41 – UHE Sobradinho energized



Service Conditions – 09:41		
hydroelectric	844	
Wind	3.342	
photovoltaic	686	
Thermal	111	
FNESE – (NE -> SE)	37	
FNEN – (NE -> N)	-8	
NE load	4.954	

At 09:34, the LT 500 kV Miracema / Gilbués was turned on.


At 9:40 am, SE Sobradinho received voltage from SE Luiz Gonzaga.

Difficulty in self-healing at the UHE Sobradinho.

Às 09h41, syncronizada a 2ª UG na UHE Itapebi – Difficulty synchronizing.

At 09:44, UHE Xingó integrated to the island through LT 500 kV Xingó / P. Afonso IV.

Machine Translated by Google Configuration at 10:50 am – Northeast integrated to the SIN




Service Conditions – 10:50 am		
hydroelectric	2.536	
Wind	3.060	
photovoltaic	687	
Thermal	110	
FNESE – (NE -> SE)	185	
FNEN – (NE -> N)	201	
NE load	6.007	

At 10:32 am, the SE São João do Piauí received voltage from the SIN through the SE Ribeiro Gonçalves.

At 10:49 am, parallel between the island of the Northeast area and the Southeast area through the LT 500 kV S. João do Piauí / Sobradinho, integrating the Northeast area to the SIN.

Machine Translated by Google Configuration at 12:57 pm – Itapebi Corridor integrated into the SIN



Service Conditions – 12:57 pm		
hydroelectric	3.638	
Wind	2.477	
photovoltaic	792	
Thermal	120	
FNESE – (NE -> SE)	-499	
FNEN – (NE -> N)	122	
NE load	7.404	

At 12:01 am, the LT 500 kV Imperatriz / Marabá C2 was turned on, integrating the North area to the SIN.

As of 12:12 pm, the release of EOL and UFV generation to service the load began .

At 12:56 pm, the LT 230 kV Santo Antônio de Jesus / Funil C2 was turned on, closing the Itapebi parallel with the SIN.

Machine Translated by Google Configuration at 14:10 — Full load restoration released



Service Conditions – 2:10 pm		
hydroelectric	3.779	
Wind	2.594	
photovoltaic	1.275	
Thermal	142	
FNESE – (NE -> SE)	-1.726	
FNEN – (NE -> N)	172	
NE load	9.344	

At 2:02 pm, the LT 500 kV Bacabeira / Paranaíba III was turned on, reinforcing the interconnection between the North and Northeast systems

At 2:10 pm, the ONS authorized the total restoration of loads (93% of loads in the Northeast area were restored).

At 2:45 pm, the charges in the Northeast area were restored.

At 3:03 pm, LT 500 kV G. Valadares 6 / P. Paraíso C2 was switched on, reinforcing the Northeast / Southeast Interconnection.






Recomposition of the North Subsystem

Colinas

Tucuruí / Pará Area



OH SAS W

()-H13,88V

SE Para uapebas

()-|13,8W

SE Integradora

2 x 750 MVA


SE Serra Pelada

Miracema

1st GU connected to UHE Tucuruí	09h11
4th UG connected to HPP Tucuruí	09h41
Home charging socket	10h26
Conclusion charging socket	14h33
Parallel	12h01

- Difficulty in remote control of equipment, compromising the preparation for recomposition.
- Necessary ONS coordination in practically the entire phase fluent.
- Facilities were not prepared for rebuilding.
- UHE Tucuruí did not assume frequency control, as per set out in the instructions.

Tucuruí Area / West Section




	•			-	
$N/I \cap$	ın	\sim	.++	-	 00
Ma				1621	

 At 12:47 pm there was a partial loss of reestablished loads, around 63%, due to the shutdown automatic 138 kV bus SE Rurópolis. The restoration of loads returned at 12:59 pm following normally until the end of the restoration. At 1:50 pm, COSR-NCO authorized the full restoration of loads from Pará.

1st GU connected to UHE Tucuruí	09h11
4th GU connected to UHE Tucuruí	09h41
Home charging socket	10h35
Conclusion charging socket	13h42

Area 500/230 kV Maranhão / Estreito




1ª UG ligada UHE Estreito	09h00
4ª UG ligada UHE Estreito	09h26
Home charging socket	10h35
Conclusion charging socket	14h41

Main difficulties:

- Difficulty in resuming load.
- At 11:04 am, the Estreito HPP was shut down due to oscillation of frequency.
- ONS opted for carrying out a recomposition alternative, for the 230 kV of the SE P. Dutra.
- At 12:22 pm, the 1st GU at Estreito HPP was synchronized and elevation started generation to the programmed value. At 12:31 the plant reached programmed generation value.

Manaus area



Balbina GUs connected to vacuum	09h04
Energization of SE Balbina	09h17

Manaus subsystem

Home charging socket	09h19
Conclusion charging socket	13h45

Mauá Subsystem

Home charging socket	09h52
Conclusion charging socket	13h45

nterconnection with the SIN	13h31
-----------------------------	-------

Main difficulties:


- Failure in communication channels.
- Delay in starting up thermal generation.

Mauá: 10:59 am

Manaus: 10:10 am

Appeared: 10:09 am

Amapá area



C. Nunes UGs linked to empty	08h46
Integration with SIN	13h34
95% of the load recomposed	14h17


- Supervision and remote control issues.
- Loss of communication channel with the distribution company between 09:12 and 13:48.
- During the fluent recomposition process, 4 situations occurred that caused the beginning of recomposition.
- At the time of interconnection with the SIN, UHE Coaracy Nunes served 25 MW of load.





Recomposition of Acre/Rondônia

Samuel Area – Acre/Rondônia



Rondônia


Synchronism 1ª UG de Samuel	08:51
Home charging socket	09h18
Conclusion charging socket	11h42
Parallel	10h29


Acre

Synchronism 1ª UG de Samuel	08:51
Home charging socket	09h58
Conclusion charging socket	11:30 a.m.
Parallel	10h29

Main difficulties:

- Lack of substation preparation
- Need for recomposition coordinate.







General aspects that made the recomposition difficult

General aspects that made the recomposition difficult

- 1. Large volume of calls from agents requesting information about the situation.
- 2. Many requests for guidance on restoration actions that should be fluent.
- 3. Fluent recomposition needed to be coordinated in several areas.
- 4. Many substations were not prepared for recomposition by agents.
- 5. Failure of supervision in several installations.
- 6. Failed agent teleassistance.
- 7. Need to move operators to the facilities.
- 8. Failure in communication channels with agents.
- 9. Need to use alternative unsupervised communication channels (cell phones).
- 10. Difficulty in communicating with some agents (missed calls).
- 11. Delay in responding to ONS requests (load connection, substation preparation, line energization, etc.).
- 12. Restoration of loads disconnected by ERAC before frequency stabilization at 60 Hz.

Major Disturbances - Last 15 Years

	ORIGIN	TIME AVERAGE	Energy No Supplied (MWh)	LOAD INTERRUPTION								
DAY AND HOUR				SIN	N		NO		s		SE/C	o
				MW % MW % MV	V % MW % I	MW %						
15/08/2023 08:30	LT 500 kV Quixadá / Fortress II	02:03	46.235	22.547 34 6.058 10	00 6.206 61 2	2.355 20	7.928 20					
21/03/2018 15h48	Xingu Bipole Narrow	02:31	51.692	20.529 26 5.115 82	2 11.507 82 ⁻	1.083				8	2.824	6
28/08/2013 14h58	LT 500 kV Ribeiro Gonçalves / São João do Piauí C1 and C2	02:41	23.189	8.610 13	80	1	8.530 81		·		·	·
26/10/2012 00h14	SE Hills	03:37	37.518	10.828 17 3073 68	7.661 78					-	183	1
04/02/2011 00h08	SE Luiz Gonzaga	03:13	23.793	7.363 12	·		7.363 80		·	-		-
10/11/2009 22h13	SE Itaberá	03:38	89.371	24.566 41			802	9	104	1 23.	.660 63	

Average time = Unsupplied Energy [MWh] / Load Shedding [MW]